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Abstract: The Maximum Entropy Production (MEP) principle has been remarkably
successful in producing accurate predictions for non-equilibrium states. We argue that this
is because the MEP principle is an effective inference procedure that produces the best
predictions from the available information. Since all Earth system processes are subject
to the conservation of energy, mass and momentum, we argue that in practical terms
the MEP principle should be applied to Earth system processes in terms of the already
established framework of non-equilibrium thermodynamics, with the assumption of local
thermodynamic equilibrium at the appropriate scales.
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1. Introduction
The proposed Maximum Entropy Production (MEP) principle states that sufﬁciently complex systems
are characterized by a non-equilibrium thermodynamic state in which the rate of thermodynamic entropy
production is maximized [1–4]. Several examples have demonstrated the feasibility of the MEP
principle. For example, the prediction of atmospheric heat transport from simple considerations [5,6]
and rates of mantle convection within the Earth [7]. The explanatory power of the MEP principle is not
always fully appreciated. In the example of planetary heat transport [6] a two-box model is astonishinglyEntropy 2010, 12 614
simpleandyetabletoprovidepredictionsofpolewardheattransportthatareconsistentwithobservations
for several planetary settings.
In this paper we attempt to answer the questions: Why does the MEP principle work? How can the
MEP principle be used to increase our knowledge of the Earth system? In doing so we will consider the
theoreticalbasisoftheMEPprincipleinthefaceofwhatmayappeartobetwoconﬂictinginterpretations:
ﬁrst, that the MEP principle is a natural law that provides a description of real world systems; second,
that the MEP principle is an inference procedure that can robustly increase our information about certain
systems. We will argue that the inference procedure is the interpretation that is consistent with the
existing applications and derivations of the MEP principle recently proposed by Dewar [8]. Much of our
argument follows from the theories of E. T. Jaynes and Dewar’s attempted extension of Jaynes’ MaxEnt
procedure to non-equilibrium systems. The particular utility of our contribution is to address some of
the more conceptual or philosophical aspects and issues that arise when attempting to interpret the MEP
principle as an inference procedure. Part of our argument will be to highlight a number of assumptions
that may lead one to initially conclude that the MEP principle is a natural law. Making these assumptions
explicit will allow us to untangle a number of seemingly confusing aspects of the MEP principle that can
only be fully resolved within a conception of science which is centrally about increasing our information
about systems and therefore sits naturally within an information theoretic formulation of entropy which
can be deﬁned as the amount of information or “surprise” that a message contains.
After these conceptual issues we consider what their signiﬁcance is for scientists who wish to apply
the MEP principle to real world systems. Many systems of the Earth are in non-equilibrium states
and therefore ripe for being described in terms of thermodynamics which sets the foundations for the
application of the MEP principle. We argue that for physical processes occurring on the Earth, such
considerations can be effectively carried out in the absence of informational concepts because when we
deal with processes occurring within the Earth system, energy and mass balances are always a central
foundation, either to describe the process under consideration directly, and/or to describe the nature of
the boundaries and their sensitivity to which the process is subjected to. We argue that this effectively
translates the information theory based MEP principle into a thermodynamic MEP principle. In doing
so, we acknowledge that there will be instances in which the conservation of energy and mass are of
less relevance (for instance in linguistics, or in purely statistical analyses of data in which the MaxEnt
approach is also used). In such cases, the purely information theory based MaxEnt approach would not
translate into thermodynamics, and the maximization of physical entropy production has little relevance
to such applications.
We structure the paper with the following sections. In Section 2 we introduce the concept of entropy
in equilibrium systems in terms of the relationship between microscopic and macroscopic properties of
systems. We then show how to calculate rates of entropy production for simple non-equilibrium states.
In Section 3 we present the MEP principle as a predictive tool that assumes certain systems will be in
states of maximum entropy production. We review a number of open issues with the MEP principle,
in particular whether the theory can be falsiﬁed and consequently whether is it a scientiﬁc theory. In
Section 4 we continue with the issue of falsiﬁcation via a discussion of the Popperian formulation of
science. In Section 5 we specify what we mean by the term probability and argue that the natural
law interpretation of the MEP principle is based on a frequentist interpretation. We present the BayesianEntropy 2010, 12 615
interpretationandoutlinetheprocessofBayesianinference. InSection6wegiveanoverviewofDewar’s
information theoretic derivation of the MEP principle and how it can be seen as extending the MaxEnt
inference procedure to a class of systems that have non-equilibrium states. In Section 7 we argue that
as all real world systems must conserve energy and matter, we can safely translate information theoretic
concepts into thermodynamic ones when modelling the Earth system. We show how systems that have
states that are further from thermodynamic equilibrium will require more information in order to model
accurately which is equivalent to specifying more boundary conditions for the MEP principle procedure.
We propose that the MEP principle can be used to better incorporate sub-grid scale processes without a
commensurate increase in computational cost. We conclude the paper in Section 8 with a discussion.
2. What is Entropy and Entropy Production?
2.1. Equilibrium States
Statistical mechanics is the application of probability to physical theories. It explains the macroscopic
properties of systems such as temperature and pressure in terms of the microscopic arrangements of the
elements that comprise the system. Real world systems typically have a very large number of individual
molecules. Foranisolatedsystem(asystemthatdoesnotexchangeenergyormasswithitssurroundings)
at equilibrium, we should expect it to be in the most probable macroscopic state which corresponds to
the greatest number of different ways that the individual molecules can rearrange themselves. This
probabilistic feature becomes effectively a law when we deal with systems that have extremely large
numbers of individual elements. The Gibbs conﬁguration entropy of a system is a measure of the
number of different ways that the microscopic elements can arrange themselves so as to produce the
same macroscopic property [9]. Figure 1 gives a spatial demonstration of this probabilistic basis of
entropy during the evolution from an initial low entropy to maximum entropy state in a rigid box that
contains a number of gas molecules. It was Bolzmann who showed at thermodynamic equilibrium, one
can compute the entropy of a system with:
S = kB ln⌦ (1)
where kB is the Boltzmann constant and translates the microscopic energy of particles to the macroscopic
property of temperature and ⌦ is the number of different microstates possible for a particular macrostate.
In Figure 1, the two macrostates have all the gas molecules in one side of the box or evenly distributed
throughout the box. As the number of molecules increases, the difference in ⌦ for these two different
macrostates increases. When we deal with the number of molecules that would be contained within a
litre of air at room temperature and sea level pressure, the difference in entropy becomes extremely large
and the probability of all molecules being in one side of the box is so small as to be safely ignored. It
is the fact that many real world systems of interest are composed of a very large number of individual
elements that leads to the power of statistical mechanics.Entropy 2010, 12 616
Figure 1. Entropy at equilibrium in an isolated system. Diagrams A and B represent a rigid
boxthatisisolatedfromtherestoftheuniverseinthatitisimpermeabletoenergyandmatter.
A similarly impermeable partition bisects the box. To the left of the partition are a number
of gas molecules. Diagram A shows the situation immediately after a dividing partition is
removed (removed instantaneously and without disturbing any of the molecules). Given the
particular properties of the individual gas molecules, there will be a particular number of
ways that they can rearrange themselves so that all of them remain in the left hand side of
the box. This number will be much less than the different arrangements of having an equal
number of molecules in both sides of the box as shown in diagram B which is the expected
distribution of molecules at equilibrium.
A B
2.2. Non-Equilibrium States
The situation changes dramatically when we move from isolated systems to closed and open systems
that exchange energy and/or matter with their surroundings as shown in Figure 2. Now suppose that
the left and right hand sides of the box are connected to heat reservoirs. The left hand side reservoir is
hotter than the right hand side. The left hand side will impart energy to gas molecules via conduction
when a molecule hits that side of the box (we ignore the effects of radiation). This will produce an
energy gradient where heated molecules on the left have more energy and so velocity than the cooler
molecules on the right. Rather than an equal number of molecules on each side of the box we will
typically observe fewer faster moving molecules on the left and more, slower moving molecules on the
right hand side. Now, let us suppose that the temperatures of the hot and cold reservoirs can vary. As
the molecules transfer heat, the temperature of the hot reservoir will decrease and the cold reservoir
increase. Furthermore let us suppose that we can alter the ﬂux of heat transported by the molecules. This
could be achieved in two ways. First, we could vary the physical properties of the molecules so that they
conduct more or less heat. Alternatively we could alter the amount of heat that is transferred from the
heat reservoir to the molecules. In order to do that, imagine that we have a dial at our disposal that alters
the amount of heat delivered from the reservoir to the left hand side of the box by raising or lowering
an insulating barrier. The dial can turn from 0 to 10 where 0 represents no heat transferred to 10 where
maximum heat is transferred. When the dial is set to 0 the box will be uniformly at the temperature of
the cold reservoir. At equilibrium, the molecules will be at a maximum entropy state as the box can be
considered an isolated system and so the molecules will be uniformly distributed. We now increase the
dial to its maximum value. Furthermore, we assume that the molecules can transfer this heat arbitrarily
fast so that there is no temperature difference between left and right sides of the box. This leads to aEntropy 2010, 12 617
uniform distribution of molecules as once again there is no heat gradient and so the system has maximum
entropy. Processes operating on the Earth are not isolated in that they exchange energy and/or matter
with their surroundings. Also, the ﬂuxes of heat through them are ﬁnite. Consequently they will be at
non-equilibrium states which cannot be predicted from classical thermodynamics as it can no longer be
assumed that these states will be maximum entropy states.
Figure 2. Entropy in non-isolated systems. A rigid box that contains a number of gas
molecules is connected to a hot and cold reservoir. In diagram A, an insulating partition
separates the hot reservoir and the box. At equilibrium the molecules will be in a state
of maximum entropy. In diagram B the insulating partition is partially raised so that an
amount of heat ﬂows from the hot reservoir into the box. This sets up a temperature gradient
which results in a decrease in the entropy of the gas molecules. The dissipation of heat
gradients keeps the gas molecules away from the maximum entropy equilibrium state. This
non-equilibrium state may be a steady state with respect to the temperatures of the hot and
cold reservoirs and the conﬁgurational entropy of the gas molecules.
Hot
Hot
Cold
Cold
A
B
3. Entropy production and the MEP principle
In the simple box model, a dial was used to adjust the heat ﬂow such that the gas molecules were
not at thermodynamic equilibrium. For the Earth’s atmosphere and other similarly dissipative systems,
the system itself adjusts to the thermodynamic gradient. The MEP principle proposes that the Earth’s
atmosphere and other complex systems are in particular thermodynamic states of maximum entropy
production. The rate of change of entropy, dS/dt, for these systems can be formulated as
dS
dt
=   +
X
i
NEEi (2)Entropy 2010, 12 618
where NEE is the Net Entropy Exchanged across the boundary of the system and   is the entropy
produced within the system. In steady state where dS/dt =0 , we have
  = F · r
✓ 1
T
◆
=  
X
i
NEEi (3)
where F is the heat ﬂux (e.g., see [1]) . Consequently, the rate of entropy production within the system
can be calculated from the exchange ﬂuxes of entropy into and out of the system. Such ﬂuxes can
be easier to compute than the entropy production within the system. Figure 3 shows the different
components for the entropy produced within a simple system. In [6], Lorenz et al. formulated a simple
2-box climate model of the Earth, Mars and Titan that was able to accurately predict equatorial and polar
temperatures by assuming that the rate of heat ﬂux from the equator to the pole produced maximum rates
of entropy production. This model is shown in Figure 4.
Figure 3. The rate of change of entropy production of a system over time, is a function
of the entropy produced within the system and the entropy that is imported and exported
into its surroundings. If Reservoir 1 where hotter than Reservoir 2, there would be a ﬂux of
heat through the system from hot to cold. NEE1 would import entropy into the system and
NEE2 would export entropy while   would be determined by the temperature gradient and
the rate of heat ﬂux.
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For Mars and Titan while the amount of insolation at the equator and poles are known, temperatures
are not know. The approach was to assume that these atmospheres “select” the rate of heat transport such
that   is at a maximum. This was essentially the same approached adopted by Paltridge in [5] who solved
a 10-box Earth climate model by assuming that latitudinal heat transport was at a steady state value that
produced maximum rates of entropy production. As with Paltridge’s original study, no explanation was
offered as to why these atmospheres were in these MEP states. However, given that there is a very large
number of different ways for them to organise themselves, the fact that they are in MEP states seems
to suggest that in some respects they “must” be in that state. The hypothesis proposed was that other
atmospheres or other similarly complex systems would also be in MEP states and so a new and powerful
approach to understanding such systems was possible.Entropy 2010, 12 619
Figure 4. Two box climate model. A simple two box climate model is shown. The equator
receives more energy from the sun (I for insolation) than the poles; Ie >I p. Longwave
emissions, E, are also larger; Ee >E p. The difference in insolation sets up a temperature
gradient where the equator is hotter than the poles; Te >T p. A certain amount of heat, F,
ﬂows over this gradient with a diffusivity term, D, parameterising how easily this heat ﬂows
polewards. Over decadal time scales, the Earth’s climate is in steady state: energy emitted
equals energy absorbed.
Equator Pole
Ie   Ee   F = Ip   Ep + F
F = D(Te   Tp)
Ie Ee Ip Ep
3.1. Ambiguities of and Objections to the MEP Principle
The MEP principle as proposed faced two objections: First, if the MEP principle was applicable to
a range of systems, we should expect empirical conﬁrmation of the MEP principle from other studies.
In the absence of other conﬁrmation of MEP principle, we are faced with the possibility that the MEP
principle is not a universal principle but something particular to the systems studied or even something
particular with how these systems have been modelled. It should also be possible to reproduce them
in controlled conditions. Experiments with ﬂuids that have temperature dependent viscosity [10] would
initially appear to possess the sufﬁcient conditions to be in MEP states, however to date no such states
have been observed [S. Schymanski, personal correspondence]. Second, no mechanism or explanation
was proposed as to how the state of MEP was achieved in these or other systems. A number of studies by
Dewar [8,11,12] have attempted to derive the MEP principle as an extension of the MaxEnt procedure
of Jaynes [13,14]. This is an ongoing project (see Dewar this issue).
A symptom of the absence of an exact analytical understanding of the MEP principle is the inexact
speciﬁcation of when the MEP principle will and will not be applicable. A common expression within
MEP studies is that MEP will be observed in systems that are “sufﬁciently complex”, or have “sufﬁcient
degrees of freedom”. Indeed, we began this paper with such an expression. This begs the question: how
complex is sufﬁciently complex? For example, the Earth’s atmosphere is not in a state of MEP with
respect to short to long wave radiation absorption and emissions because there are no real degrees of
freedom for the system to do otherwise [15]. The question then becomes, what rate of entropy production
is being maximised for any particular system? If the MEP principle is a description of some aspect of
the real world, then our job is to identify those systems that we suspect are MEP systems. The procedure
appears to be that we initially propose some system S1 to be a MEP system. We model this system andEntropy 2010, 12 620
in doing so produce a function for the rate of entropy production. By ﬁnding those parameter values that
maximum this function we are able to produce a set of predictions P1. If P1 are found to agree with
observations, then we have at the same time identiﬁed S1 to be an MEP system and produced a useful
set of predictions (e.g., temperatures on the surface of a planet and amount of heat ﬂux). If P1 turns out
to be inaccurate then we conclude that S1 is not an MEP system. The problem then arises of how is the
MEP principle falsiﬁed? Any particular study that concludes that the MEP principle does not accurately
predict some aspect of a system can be explained by claiming that the system is not a MEP system.
Consequently, if one requires falsiﬁcation to be a necessary condition of any scientiﬁc theory, the MEP
principle is not a scientiﬁc theory.
4. Science and Falsiﬁcation
In order to evaluate the epistemological basis of the MEP principle, we will consider the role of
falsiﬁcation in the formulation of scientiﬁc theories. The notion of falsiﬁcation is central to the Popperian
formulation of science [16]. This is how for example, an astronomy theory differs from a astrological
one. An astronomy theory will have well deﬁned terms under which observational evidence can be used
to show that the theory is false. Popper argued that it is impossible to prove any theory is true. Rather we
have a certain degree of conﬁdence that it is true with that conﬁdence being largely based on the quality
of its predictions and how readily it is falsiﬁable. For example, consider two competing theories. Theory
T1 produces more predictions that can in principle be falsiﬁed than theory T2. By Popper’s account,
T1 is the better theory. In a sense it must be better because there is greater opportunity to disprove it.
There is then an inverse relationship between information and probability of a theory being true. T1
will have more information than T2 as it provides more routes for falsiﬁcation. This means that T1
is less likely to survive as it has more possibilities for being shown to be false. This use of survival
was used in quite a literal sense as Popper envisaged a form of natural selection operating on scientiﬁc
theories. Much as natural selection weeds out the weak individuals from a population, so falsiﬁcation
removes poor theories. This is how we can account for the notion of scientiﬁc progress which Popper
formulates thus:
PS1 ! TT1 ! EE1 ! PS2
where PS1 is a Problem Situation at time 1. TT1 is the set of different and competing theories that seek
to explain or solve PS1. EE1 is the process of error elimination or falsiﬁcation. Empirical and theoretical
data are used to attempt to falsify theories with those theories that survive being part of the process
by which new problems are formulated at time 2, PS2, and so the process continues. In this fashion,
problems beget solutions which beget new problems and scientiﬁc progress marches onwards.
The natural law interpretation of the MEP principle is that it can make a number of accurate
predictions for complex systems that defy analysis via other theories. However, as we argued in the
previous section, any empirical evidence that does not agree with a MEP principle prediction does not
represent any falsiﬁcation of the theory, rather the identiﬁcation of the “fact” that the system is not a MEP
system. What appears to be required is the formulation of the rules of engagement for the MEP; under
what conditions will the MEP apply to certain systems. In the absence of a set of rules or guidelines that
allow us to identify MEP systems, then the MEP principle itself cannot be a scientiﬁc theory becauseEntropy 2010, 12 621
it will always be possible to explain erroneous predictions as instances where the MEP principle was
applied incorrectly. The natural law interpretation solution to this problem is to argue that the MEP
principle is a developing theory and that at some point in the future a derivation may be produced that
details exactly under what circumstances systems will and will not produce maximum rates of entropy.
WhileweacknowledgethatthereisstillsomewaytogobeforetheMEPprincipleisﬁrmlyestablished
on analytical grounds, we believe that seeking a formulation of the principle that will guarantee the
production of accurate predictions for the steady states of real world systems to be fundamentally
misguided. Rather, the MEP principle is a procedure or method for increasing our information about
real world systems. The particular utility of the MEP is not to reveal the “true” steady states of systems,
but as a robust inference procedure that allows us to increase the amount of information about the
fundamentally probabilistic states of systems. In order to explain this further, we must ﬁrst clarify what
we mean by the term “probability” and how it is related to information.
5. Information, Probability and Inference
The natural law interpretation of the MEP principle is that it is a description of particular systems.
There is “something about them” such that they are in particular steady states of entropy production.
There is an inherent probabilistic aspect to the MEP principle and we believe that it is a particular
interpretation of probability that is largely responsible for the natural law interpretation. This is the
“frequentist” interpretation of probability in which the probability of observing an event (e.g., a coin
landing heads up) is proportional to the frequency of that event occurring over a very large number of
trials. In order to produce an exact value for the probability of ﬂipping a head or a tail we would need an
inﬁnite number of trails. That is, the probability of observing a heads or tails is a property of the coin in
the same way that is has intensive and extensive properties such as mass or density. Conducting trials are
analogous to taking measurements in that they are ways of ﬁnding out the properties of a system. Within
equilibrium and non-equilibrium statistical mechanics, entropy and rates of entropy production can be
regarded as probabilistic descriptions of aspects of the system. Therefore the frequency of observing that
particular macroscopic state over a very large number of observations is related the Gibbs conﬁgurational
entropy of a system:
S =  kB
X
i
pi ln pi (4)
where pi is the probability of the ith microstate for a given energy level. The connection to ergodicity
comes from the frequentist interpretation of probability so that a system will explore those microstates
possible for that energy level. The probability of ﬁnding a system in a particular conﬁguration of
microstates is proportional to how long it will be in that particular conﬁguration over a very long period
of time. One conclusion of this is that a system will, if given sufﬁcient time, explore all possible
microstates, no matter how improbable or however long one would need to wait in order to observe
such improbable states.
5.1. Inference and Information
There are alternative interpretations of probability. Dewar’s derivations of the MEP principle are
ultimately predicated on the Bayesian interpretation. Bayesian probability theories are subject toEntropy 2010, 12 622
criticisms that are beyond the scope of this paper. Here we limit our argument to establishing that point
that the MEP principle is only a cogent theory when one adopts a Bayesian interpretation of probability.
Rather than say that the probability of observing a Bernoulli trial event such as a coin landing heads
up is a property of the coin, we instead say that assigning a probability to observing a heads is a way that
we quantify what we know about the coin. For example, given the two possible outcomes (we ignore
the possibility that the coin can land on its side), we propose the initial hypotheses of H1 that states that
there is a 0.5 probability of the coin landing head’s up and H2 that states there is a 0.5 probability of
tails landing. H1 and H2 are mutually exclusive and p(H1) + p(H2) = 1 . Suppose that we now conduct
a number of trials and that we repeatedly get more heads than tails. We would being to suspect that the
coin is not fair. It may be weighted. H1 and H2 were based on our initial beliefs about the system which
we increasingly believe were not correct. However, given no reasons to suspect the coin (unless it was
being ﬂipped by a known crook!) there are no reasons to ground our beliefs otherwise. Consequently, the
probabilityweascribetoeventscanchangeastheamountofinformationwehaveaboutasystemchanges
and so our degree of conﬁdence of a particular hypothesis can change. Information can be obtained not
only by performing trials (ﬂipping the coin), but also making observations and measurements on the
coin. For example we can weigh it, determine its centre of balance, assess how ﬂat it is etc. We can also
examine how the coin is ﬂipped. In [17] Jaynes provides a tour de force in considering whether there is
in fact such a thing as a random coin ﬂip or any truly random process.
Probability can now be seen as assigning a value to our ignorance about a particular system or
hypothesis. Rather than the entropy of a system being a particular property of a system, it is instead
a measure of how much we know about a system. For the gas molecules in a box, at thermodynamic
equilibrium, the probability of a particular molecule being at a particular place is equal to it being at any
other place. We have absolutely no information as to exactly where it and all the other molecules are.
The situation changes as we move away from equilibrium. For example, if there is a temperature gradient
within the molecules, then it is more probable for a particular molecule to be nearer the cold reservoir
rather than the hot reservoir. The more we know about the system, the more information we have on
the boundary conditions, the more probable that a particular prediction for the position of a particular
molecule becomes. Bayesian inference is the procedure which employs these notions of probability
and information. It proceeds on the basis of making predictions about systems which are based on the
available information. These initial predictions are then updated as and when information about the
system is obtained. For the gas molecules, we could produce a set of predictions PG with each element
of PG assigning a probability that the ith molecule was in the jth position (assuming a ﬁnite number of
discrete positions). If we observe molecule n at position m, then all the probability functions of PG are
updated to incorporate that information. In the language of the Bayesian Probability Calculus, an initial
hypothesis H has a “prior” probability distribution function. The probability that evidence, E, will be
observed that conﬁrms H is the “posterior” probability distribution function. In the gas molecule case, if
H is the hypothesis that molecule i is in position j, then the probability that H is true given the current
evidence, E, is given with:
P(H|E)=
P(E|H)P(H)
P(E)
(5)Entropy 2010, 12 623
The process is essentially iterative as posteriors can inform the construction of new priors as new
evidence is obtained and the process is repeated. As our information about systems change, the
probabilities that we assign to events or hypotheses change.
6. MaxEnt and the MEP Principle
Bayesian inference can be seen as a procedure to leverage the most amount of information from what
is currently known about a system. An important component of that procedure is the formulation of the
initial prior functions. That is, given the information to hand, how do we construct initial probability
functions for our hypotheses? Jaynes showed that the best position to adopt is one where the Shannon
informational entropy of the initial probability density functions is maximised [18]. This will produce
prior functions that will make only those assumptions that are justiﬁed by the available information.
The Shannon Entropy of a message is proportional to the amount of information that the message
communicates from sender to receiver [19]. For example if John has rolled a six sided die and sends a
messagetoJanethatthesideuppermostisanevennumber, thenJanehasreceivedinformationthatallows
her to ignore three possible sides out of six. In the absence of any message, Jane would assign uniform
probability functions for the priors to all numbers. By constructing prior probability density functions
with the maximum amount of entropy, we ensure that no additional assumptions “sneak in” to our initial
beliefs. MaxEnt can be understood as allowing us to make the least worse initial predictions. MaxEnt
is not a theory about the behaviour or property of real world systems, but a procedure or algorithm that
scientists can use to make the most accurate or probable hypotheses and predictions about systems. As
well as applications to equilibrium thermodynamics, MaxEnt has also been used in image reconstruction
and spectral analysis. Jaynes’ long term (and unﬁnished) project was to show how the logic of Bayesian
inference underpins all of science.
The MaxEnt approach is brieﬂy illustrated here for the case of the ideal gas. The macroscopic
equations that govern the behavior of the ideal gas such as the ideal gas law can be derived from MaxEnt
in the scope of statistical mechanics. The derivation requires two, very basic constraints: energy and
mass conservation. The energy conservation adds the Lagrange multiplier that yields temperature (or,
more precisely kBT, with kB being the Boltzmann constant), which then forms the basis for deriving
the Boltzmann distribution etc. The example of the ideal gas in a state of thermodynamic equilibrium
should therefore be the limit case of any non-equilibrium thermodynamic state as the most simple or
least constrained.
To describe a state away from thermodynamic equilibrium, we need to add more constraints and
information. If exchange of mass takes place, we get chemical potential and alike as additional Lagrange
multipliers from these additional constraints. To describe gradients, we need to explicitly represent
variables in space and/or time, which adds more and more information. In the context of the ideal
gas, we still, however, stay within the well-established framework of thermodynamics, except that the
assumption of thermodynamic equilibrium holds only at smaller scales.
Dewar has attempted to show that the MEP principle is an extension of Jaynes’ MaxEnt procedure
to non-equilibrium states. Rather than producing predictive hypotheses for their equilibrium states, the
MEP principle instead uses the available information in the most effective way in order to produce
predictive hypotheses about the trajectories that these systems will take over time. If it is assumed thatEntropy 2010, 12 624
the systems are in steady state, then such predictions should be in agreement with observations of the
system. Dewar has characterised the MEP principle as a procedure that turns information (in the form
of constraints) into predictions, perhaps much as a mathematician is a biological machine that turns
coffee into theorems. This can be an iterative procedure much in the same way as Popper envisaged
scientiﬁc progress:
I1 ! P1 ! O1 ! I2
Information at time 1, I1, is used to formulate boundary conditions for a model. The MEP principle is
employed to produce a set of predictions, P1. Observations (empirical and theoretical) at time 1, O1, are
compared to P1 with any difference between them being used to update the new boundary conditions at
time2, I2. Intermsofaprocedure thatincreasesinformationaboutsystems, theMEPprincipleprocedure
perhaps somewhat paradoxically produces most information when O1 6= P1. Observations can be seen as
a message from the real world system to the model of that system. If this message has the same content
as the set of predictions, then no additional information about the real world system is communicated.
This may appear paradoxical because a correct prediction surely tells us that the information used to
formulate the boundary conditions was sufﬁcient for the production of accurate predictions. However,
this only conﬁrms the information that was already known. What we are primarily motivated to do is
obtain new information. This only happens when the observation contains a certain amount of “surprise”.
What is important in this procedure is its repetition which will allow the construction of a gradient which
can help guide the formulation of new boundary conditions. This is analogous to the childhood game
of “hunt the thimble” in which an object is hidden with the searchers only being told if they are warmer
(nearer) or colder (further) to the object with reference to their previous guess. In this respect the MEP
principle is conceptually compatible with an inference formulation of science in the terms proposed
by Caticha in [20,21]. Indeed there are tantalising analogues between Caticha’s theories and Dewar’s
recent attempted derivations of the MEP principle which have alluded to an information theoretic (and
we would argue, inference) basis of Hamiltonian dynamics.
7. MEP Principle and the Earth System
When we want to apply MEP to Earth system processes, we ﬁrst should recognize that we deal
with a world of molecules. Whether we discuss the large-scale motion of Earth’s atmosphere, the
global hydrologic cycle, plate tectonics, or photosynthesizing organisms, these processes all deal with
the transport and transformation of molecules at a highly aggregated scale. These dynamics are all
subject to the energy and mass balance constraints of the Earth system. Hence, when we follow the
MaxEnt approach and interpret MEP from an information theoretical perspective, then these two basic
constraints yield us the classical thermodynamic variables as Lagrange multipliers. The information
theory based interpretation quickly translates into a thermodynamic one. If MEP subjected to these two
constraints does not yield predictions consistent with observations, it should not be seen as the failure
of MEP per se, but rather as the lack of further relevant information, for instance in terms of additional
constraints. Hence, there is no conﬂict between an information theory based derivation of MEP and the
thermodynamic applications of MEP (as in e.g., [1–4]).Entropy 2010, 12 625
7.1. Earth System Processes away from Thermodynamic Equilibrium
As stated above, the state of thermodynamic equilibrium would seem to serve as a reference state
that is the most simple in its nature since merely the energy and mass balance contain the relevant
information. Imagine Earth in a state of thermodynamic equilibrium. We would need separate energy
andmassbalancesforthedifferentstatesofmatter: thegaseousphase(mostlytheatmosphere), theliquid
state of water (mostly oceans), and the solid state of water (mostly ice sheets) and of the Earth’s crust
and interior. These balances would yield the typical thermodynamic variables as Lagrange multipliers,
such as the temperatures and pressures of the atmosphere, oceans, ice sheets etc. The overall state of the
Earth would then be characterized by a dozen or so thermodynamic variables in total.
The present-day Earth is far away from thermodynamic equilibrium so we need more information to
describe its state. What does this mean? First, we have variations of thermodynamic variables in space
and time. To describe such gradients, we clearly require more information to describe these. Examples of
such gradients and how these relate to thermodynamic variables are: topographic gradients are reﬂected
in the differences in height between mountains and the sea ﬂoor, resulting in gradients in gravitational
potential; temperature gradients are maintained between the surface and the air aloft, between the tropics
and the poles, and between the oceans and the land. Gradients in relative humidity are gradients in the
chemical potential of water vapor. High concentration of reactive oxygen in Earth’s atmosphere and
reducing conditions in the Earth’s mantle result in chemical potential gradients.
All of these gradients can be expressed in terms of common variables of equilibrium thermodynamics:
radiative temperatures, kinematic temperatures, chemical potentials and so on. The underlying
assumption is that the well known laws of equilibrium thermodynamics still hold and can be applied,
but at a much smaller scale. To do so, we then introduce the notion of local thermodynamic equilibrium.
In other words, to analyse the Earth with equilibrium thermodynamics, we no longer apply equilibrium
thermodynamics at the planetary scale, but rather at a much ﬁner scale. It would then seem logical to
hypothesize that as a system moves away further and further away from thermodynamic equilibrium,
the system would need to be represented at ﬁner and ﬁner scales. Dynamic properties like temporal
variability and spatial heterogeneity are then inherently a result of a system that is driven far away
from thermodynamic equilibrium. This should, for instance, be reﬂected in the spatial and temporal
autocorrelation structures, as illustrated in Figure 5. At thermodynamic equilibrium, trivially so, we ﬁnd
the highest autocorrelation since the thermodynamic variables are constant in space and time. As the
system moves further and further away from thermodynamic equilibrium, these structures should show
less and less autocorrelation. Less autocorrelation in turn represents increased “memory” of a system.
Since such a state is associated with greater gradients and more irreversibility and entropy production of
the ﬂuxes that are driven by these gradients, this would suggest that the thermodynamic state of a system
away from equilibrium is directly linked to its memory and its rate of entropy production.Entropy 2010, 12 626
Figure 5. Illustration of how variables should change as a system is maintained further and
further away from thermodynamic equilibrium. The state of thermodynamic equilibrium is
characterized by global variables (e.g., T,p,⇢) that are constant in space and time. The
further the system is maintained away from equilibrium, the more the state should be
associated with larger and larger gradients in space and time. The characteristic spatial
scale  x at which the assumption of thermodynamic equilibrium applies should therefore
decrease correspondingly, resulting in local variables (illustrated by Ti,p i,⇢i).
thermodynamic
equilibrium
far from
equilibrium
global variables:
T, p,  
 x
local variables:
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7.2. Increasing the Resolution of Earth System Models: a Practical Application of the MEP Principle
We conclude this section with a brief discussion on how the MEP principle can be used to inform
Earth System Models and so increase our information about the Earth. The fundamental challenge
all Earth System Models face is ﬁnding the spatial and temporal resolution that allows the numerical
solutions to be computationally tractable with the resources currently available but not to coarse grain
the systems so much that important dynamics are lost. There would appear to be an inevitable trade
off between model resolution and time required for computation. The lowest level of resolution is the
“grid” which is a volume of ocean, land and atmosphere. At the scale of its grid, a model will assume
local thermodynamic equilibrium if it parameterizes this grid scale by one set of variables. While there
are probably no obvious violations of the second law in such models, there are nevertheless several
issues related to the thermodynamic formulation of processes within such models. First, ﬂuxes are not
always expressed in terms of thermodynamic gradients that drive ﬂuxes. For instance, it is common
to model condensation leading to instantaneous precipitation while such a conversion should be driven
by the chemical potential gradient associated with supersaturated vapor. Also, in terrestrial vegetation
models, root respiration releases carbon dioxide that quite often is released into the free atmosphere
instantaneously instead of being driven by the emergent gradient that drives the ﬂux from the root to the
soil to the air. In a thermodynamic context, these models contain the formulation of gradients that do not
respond to ﬂuxes and are therefore likely to result in biases in the magnitude of these ﬂuxes.
We propose that the MEP principle applied at the grid scale may help allow better parameterizations
of the grid scale behaviour which will include sub-grid scale spatial heterogeneity and variability withinEntropy 2010, 12 627
time steps of integration. This would then imply that local thermodynamic equilibrium no longer
need to be assumed at the grid scale. For example the MEP principle should allow us to derive
better parameterizations of subgrid scale processes in numerical simulation models, see [22]. Figure 6
shows how the MEP principle can be used to increase the accuracy of the parameterizations of sub-grid
scale processes.
Figure 6. Illustration of (a) a global grid used in climate models. Such grids are used for
a discrete representation of variables, such as temperature, and implicitly assume a state
of thermodynamic equilibrium within the grid. Subgrid scale heterogeneity, as found for
instance in form of pattern formation of vegetation found in semiarid regions (b), illustrate
that subgrid scale processes can operate far from thermodynamic equilibrium. MEP could
help to scale up subgrid scale heterogeneity so that this is adequately represented at the grid
scale, as for instance shown by [22]. Photo credit: Stephen Prince.
a. climate model grid b. pattern formation 
in semiarid regions
8. Discussion
In this paper we have argued that the MEP principle is not a physical law that describes the
properties of a certain class of system, but is instead a potentially widely applicable method of inference
which we believe has particular utility for increasing our information about non-equilibrium systems
such as the Earth. Our argument required a Bayesian interpretation of probability which centred
around our level of ignorance about systems and their dynamics. Probability is not a description of
some property of a system, but rather a quantiﬁcation of how much we know about it. The MEP
principle is a potentially iterative procedure in which available information about a system is used to
produce predictive hypotheses which are then compared with observations. Any differences between
observational data and predictions corresponds to additional information about the system that can then
be used to update the model. We argued that the MEP principle procedure is of particular utility becauseEntropy 2010, 12 628
like the MaxEnt procedure that is used to produce the most probable predictions for equilibrium systems,
the MEP principle leverages the maximum from the information to hand in order to produce the most
probable predictions for the steady state trajectories of non-equilibrium systems. This interpretation
of the MEP principle means that it is effectively silent on what information is and is not relevant
to the formulation of boundary conditions which are used as Lagrange multipliers within the MEP
principle procedure. It is our job as intelligent, inquisitive agents to capture the required information.
Consequently, the absence of an exact deﬁnition of the “sufﬁcient degrees of freedom that a system needs
to possess in order for the MEP principle to be observed” does not represent an outstanding speciﬁcation
or detail of the MEP principle but is rather an unavoidable conclusion of any inference procedure. The
procedure itself cannot tell us what is and what is not relevant to formulating a model. It can only use
the information that we give it, which it promises to use as effectively as possible.
The other side of this story is that the MEP principle can also be used to ﬁnd information that is not
necessary for the production of accurate predictions. For example, if our initial information or beliefs
about a state is that it is far from equilibrium and complex with many processes occurring within it, we
may build a commensurately complex model that may produce accurate predictions. Some Earth System
Models and General Circulation Models are very complex systems in their own right and they may very
accurately predict aspects of the Earth’s climate. The MEP principle shows that some of the information
in these models, in fact nearly all the information, is irrelevant when it comes to predicting equatorial
and polar temperatures, and rates of latitudinal heat transport. The MEP principle can be applied in
conjunction with Occam’s Razor in that we should be motivated to ﬁnd the model that produces accurate
predictions with the minimal amount of information. For example in the 2-box climate model, a single
scalar parameter, D, controlled the rate of heat ﬂux from the equator to the poles. Buried within D must
be the net effects of the properties of the Earth’s atmosphere and oceans. Not including such details tells
us that such information is irrelevant for the purposes of the model. This issue is related to a question
that arose during the MEP workshop in Jena 2009: What if the Earth’s sea was made of vinegar? Given
that the simple 2-box model has no information about the composition of the oceans, then it would
produce exactly the same set of predictions if the oceans were suddenly replaced with vinegar. This
question was in part addressed by [6] that showed the MEP principle was able to accurately predict
aspects of atmospheres that are in many ways very different to the Earth. This demonstrates that for
complex systems such as planetary atmospheres, information that pertains to their composition may
not be required for the production of accurate predictions of some of their properties. If we wished to
understand the role of the Earth’s oceans in the transport of heat, then it may well be necessary to include
more information in our model that may include certain properties of water. The amount of information
we provide to a model is not only determined by what we currently know about the system, but what we
are hoping to ﬁnd out.
We argued that when employing the MEP principle in the analysis of the Earth system, the
conservation of energy, mass and momentum are unavoidable constraints. This leads to an effective
correspondence of the information theoretic interpretation to a non-equilibrium thermodynamic one
as energy, mass and momentum conservation will supply Lagrange multipliers to the MEP principle
proceduresuchthattheinformationtheoreticaspectscanbesafelyoverlaidwithphysicalthermodynamic
concepts. This allows a number of simpliﬁcations in model formulations which rest ultimately onEntropy 2010, 12 629
the MEP principle but which can be formulated in non-information theoretic terms. Given that
our motivation in modelling systems is to increase our understanding of them, we believe that this
interpretation of the MEP principle best captures what scientists are actually doing when they use it.
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